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Abstract
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
This article analyses the financial structure of GDF SUEZ for the years 2013 – 2014 by the way of a 
case study. The company, one of the global players of the energy market, offers rich opportunities 
to test finance theories reaching from the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Altman 
(1968) to the more recent approaches of working capital analysis by Panigrahi and Chaudhury 
(2015), to mention but a few. The study shows a company struggling to accelerate sales and to 
collect receivables, while over relying on costly short-term finance and stretching accounts 
payable. Thus, GDF SUEZ forgoes prompt payment discounts and loses supplier goodwill. Taken 
together with declining revenues, the study provides for a company profile raising going concern 
issues. The paper may be of interest for finance students, scholars and financial reports analysts 
as it offers a comprehensive real-life study based on commonly accepted financial modelling.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Arguably, not least from the view point of its 
balance sheet, GDF SUEZ represents one of the big 
players of the global energy sector. Further, one 
would expect the company to be well structured 
financially and well managed operatively - no 
doubt, GDF SUEZ can offer best advice and highly 
remunerated experts. To test these assumptions, it 
may be worthwhile to undertake basic financial 
analysis using its publicly available financial 
statements. Finance theories based on decades of 
academic research are considered a suitable choice 
of weapon. Hence, the paper is structured as 
follows: the theories are introduced in the 
methodology section. The results derived from 
applying the theories are assessed in the discussion 
section. Finally, the conclusion provides for a 
summary of central findings.  
 
METHODS 
 
This case study is built around the theories 
of finance widely accepted in the academia and the 
analyst’s community. The starting point is provided 
by Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963). . The 
matching principle is identified as a major issue of 
the GDF SUEZ financial structure, as represented 
by the works of Agar (2005), Demodaran (2010), 
Gitman and Zutter (2015) and Harc (2015). It is 
followed by a thorough discussion of working 
capital issues which are introduced by Altmann 
(1968) and are more recently explored by 
Pinkowitz (2000), Myddelton (2000), Drobetz et al. 
(2010), Bolek (2013), Panigrahi and Chaudhury 
(2015), to mention just a view. The results are 
compared to industry benchmarks and numerous 
empirical studies like that of Opler et al. (1999), 
Dichev and Scinner (2002), Ogier et al. (2004), 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Saddour (2006) and 
Ratshikuni (2009). The study offers various 
formulas of financial ratios and provides for a 
comprehensive list of references.  
 
DISCUSSION   
 
Appraisal of GDF SUEZ’s capital structure  
    
The capital structure of a firm deals with the 
sources of finance used by the company (Myers, 
2001). Capital is to be invested in assets which are 
needed for the company’s operations (Eccles and 
Serafeim, 2014). On the asset-side of the Statement 
of Financial Position of GDF SUEZ for the year 
2014, goodwill, available-for-sale-securities, loans 
granted to affiliated companies, other assets (tax 
receivables), deferred tax assets and cash account 
for €45,484m, i.e. 91.8% of shareholder equity and 
27.5% of total assets. 
 
Formula for Goodwill    
     (1) 
Goodwill    
 € 21,222m  
Available-for-sale-securities  
 € 2,893m 
Loans granted to affiliated companies 
 € 1,237m 
Current other assets (tax receivables) 
 € 10,049m 
Non-current other assets (tax receivables) 
 € 557m 
Deferred tax assets   
 € 980m 
Cash     
 € 8,546m 
Total 1     
 € 45,484m 
 
Formula Goodwill as % of Shareholder equity 
     (2) 
Shareholder equity    
 € 49,527m 
Total 1 as % of Shareholder equity  
 € 45,484m * 100 ./. € 49,527m = 91.8 
 
Formula for Goodwill as % of Total Assets  
     
 (3) 
Total assets    
 € 165,305m 
Total 1 as % of Total assets  
 € 45,484m * 100 ./. € 165,305m = 27.5 
 
Goodwill is an accounting measure resulting 
from prior acquisitions of other entities (ACCA, 
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2012a). It is not related to operations (Briloff, 
1972). Available-for-sale-securities are financial 
assets acquired to generate gain from a later sale 
(Needles and Powers, 2010). These are not 
genuine GDF SUEZ operations. The same is true for 
lending money to affiliates. Tax receivables may be 
challenged and reduced by tax authorities (Mills, 
1996). Deferred tax assets are a measure to 
account for book-tax-differences and are not 
generated by operations (Colley et al., 2012). Thus, 
91.8% of GDF SUEZ equity is used to finance assets 
that arise from accounting conventions or non-core 
operations. Hence, to finance genuine operations, 
GDF SUEZ incurs debt at a cost of €2,462m, which 
is 79.2% of its net profit for the year 2014. 
 
Formula for Interest expense as % of Net profit 
     (4) 
Interest expense    
 € 2,462m 
Net profit for the year 2014  
 € 3,110m 
Interest expense as % of net profit  
 € 2,462m * 100 ./. € 3,110m = 79.2  
  
GDF SUEZ has significant cash holdings of 
€8,546m that could be utilised to reduce this costly 
debt burden. However, finance theory makes 
different suggestions about how to use funds to 
adjust the company’s capital structure.   
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) claim that firm 
value does not depend on sources of corporate 
finance (debt or equity), but on the firm’s 
operational success. From this point of view, GDF 
SUEZ should only focus on generating the rate of 
return required by its shareholders without trying 
to adjust its capital structure. This view is based on 
perfect markets conditions like the absence of 
agency costs (banking and legal fees), perfect 
information among all market participants and no 
taxes (Gifford Jr., 1998). These assumptions do not 
hold under real world conditions (Glickman, 1996). 
Therefore, Modigliani and Miller (1963) add the 
tax shield of debt finance to their original model. 
Tax deductible interests help reduce tax payments 
and thus increase firm value (Brealey et al., 2011). 
From this viewpoint, GDF SUEZ should incur even 
more debt to benefit from this tax shield. But under 
real world conditions unlimited leverage is hardly 
manageable. Shareholders may request higher 
profits in return for accepting higher borrowing 
risks (Wyplosz, 1998). Finance providers may 
impose restrictive debt covenants, limiting the 
company’s capability to raise additional debt 
(Armstrong et al., 2014). Finally, a company could 
have not enough valuable assets to serve as 
collateral for further debt (Davydenko, 2013).  
GDF SUEZ’s cash holdings of €8,546m 
account for 17.3% of the company’s net assets.  
 
Formula for Cash as % of Net assets  
     (5) 
Cash     
 € 8,546m 
Shareholder equity (Net assets)  
 € 49,527m 
Cash as % of Net assets   
 € 8,546m * 100 ./. € 49,527m = 17.3 
 
This is above average cash holdings of US 
companies of 17% (Opler et al., 1999), of UK 
companies of 9.9% (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) and 
of mature French companies of 13% (Saddour, 
2006). Jung and Kim (2008) argue that firms with 
high cash holdings retain flexibility in adjusting 
their capital structure to benefit from the tax 
shield: cash reserves can be used as collateral or 
demonstrate financial strength, thus increasing the 
lender’s confidence.  
However, GDF SUEZ’s interest expense of 
€2,462m provides for an interest cover ratio (ICR) 
of 2.7.  
 
Formula for Interest cover   
     (6) 
Interest expense    
 € 2,462m 
Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
 € 6,547m 
Interest cover    
 € 6,547m ./. € 2,462m = 2.7 
 
This is 32.5% below the ICR of 4 of the US 
electric utility sector (Ogier et al., 2004). Dichev 
and Scinner (2002) show that companies with a 
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median ICR of 3.9 do not violate debt covenants, 
but 25% of lenders with ICR of 2.8 do. Standard & 
Poor’s (2006) assigns a BB-rating to companies 
with an ICR of 2.5, slightly below that of GDF SUEZ. 
Such companies are considered “significant 
speculative” and facing “major exposures to 
adverse conditions” (Standard & Poor’s, 2016). 
According to Ratshikuni (2009) 54.7% of BB-rated 
companies face bankruptcy over 15 years.   
Thus, although GDF SUEZ relies on debt 
finance and cash holdings in line with finance 
theory, in practice an ICR below 3 may constitute a 
major risk for investors and lenders (Page, 2008).  
Critical evaluation of theoretical advantages 
and disadvantages of the company’s capital 
structure with regards to the debt and equity 
structure of the business   
GDF SUEZ can generate advantages from its 
capital structure beyond the tax shield. 20.9% of its 
total liabilities result from bond issues (GDF SUEZ, 
2014). 
 
Formula for Bond issues as % of Total liabilities 
     (7) 
Non-current bond issues   
 € 21,155m 
Current bond issues   
 € 1,705m 
Total 1     
 € 22,860m 
 
Total liabilities    
 € 109,346m 
Total 1 as % of total liabilities  
 € 22,860m * 100 ./. € 109,346m = 20.9 
 
The rate of return required by bondholders 
is below that of shareholders, because 
shareholders require a risk premium. Shareholders 
bear a higher risk as their claims against the 
company are satisfied after lenders are paid 
(Brealey et al., 2011). This makes debt cheaper 
than equity (McDaniel, 1988). Otherwise GDF SUEZ 
would not borrow funds to invest in projects, but 
issue new shares (Peleg, 2014). A further 
advantage is that bondholders are not assigned 
shareholder voting rights (Rowe, 2013). Thus, 
equity holders do not lose control as would be the 
case if additional shares were issued (Gillet and De 
La Bruslerie, 2010). However, Baird and 
Henderson (2008) argue that the obligation to 
repay the principle and to pay interests can result 
in cashflow to bondholders of a magnitude which 
deprives shareholders of any meaningful factual 
control. Indeed, at GDF SUEZ interest expense 
accounts for 79.2% of net profit, leaving just 20.8% 
to equity holders. 10.4% of total liabilities result 
from bank borrowings and commercial papers 
backed by bank credit lines (GDF SUEZ, 2014).  
 
Formula for Bank borrowings and Commercial 
paper as % of Total liabilities  
 (8) 
Non-current bank borrowings  
 € 4,977m 
Current bank borrowings   
 € 1,116m  
Commercial paper (current only)  
 € 5,219 
Total 1     
 € 11,312 
 
Total liabilities    
 € 109,346m 
Total 1 as % of total liabilities  
 € 11,312 * 100 ./. 109,346m = 10.4 
 
Borrowing from banks can be advantageous 
as lending terms may be renegotiated and adjusted. 
If bonds are issued, change of terms may call for 
complicated debt restructuring (Thakor and 
Wilson, 1995). Also, banks maintain an information 
advantage through close relationship with the 
company. This reduces information asymmetry 
and as a consequence the bank’s required rate of 
return (Leitner, 2006). 
 
The disadvantages of operating a portfolio of 
debt arise from high administrative burden. The 
borrowings should be properly accounted for, 
increasing the costs of the accounting department 
(ACCA, 2012a). The statutory auditors of GDF 
SUEZ’s financial statements must check the 
borrowings, resulting in higher audit fees (ACCA, 
2012b). Borrowings made in different currencies 
call for hedging against currency fluctuations. Thus, 
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costs of hedging occur (ACCA, 2012c). As a further 
disadvantage, various debt obligations may be 
perceived as risky by lenders, increasing the 
company’s costs of borrowing (Whitehead, 2009). 
 
Assessment of GDF SUEZ from a short-term 
financing perspective and commentary on the 
application of the matching principle  
According to the maturity matching 
principle, long-term assets should be financed by 
long-term liabilities and short-term assets by 
short-term debt, respectively (Harc, 2015). 
Repayment of principle and payment of interest 
expenses should be aligned with cash flows 
generated by the very assets. Stable and lasting 
cash flows call for long-term finance, whereas 
fluctuating cash flows should be matched to 
finance available and repayable on demand (Agar, 
2005). There should be enough assets available for 
immediate sale to meet debt repayment deadlines 
(Demodaran, 2010).  
According to conservative funding strategy 
short-term assets may be partly financed with 
long-term debt to save on refinancing costs, 
because short-term debt requires refinancing after 
becoming due (AFP, 2013).  
Under aggressive funding strategy long-term 
assets are partly financed with short-term debt. 
This policy can work as long as short-term finance 
remains available (Law and Smullen, 2008). Long-
term finance charges are avoided, so that 
profitability increases, but running out of finance 
constitutes a major risk (Watson and Head, 2013). 
However, in times of rising interest rates repeated 
refinancing may lead to falling profits (Fosberg, 
2012).  
 
At GDF SUEZ short-term debt amounts to 
€34,991m (derivative instruments: €5,895m, 
borrowings: €10.297m, trade payables: €18.799m; 
provisions which form part of total current 
liabilities are not included, because they do not 
constitute cash borrowings (Ryan, 2004). Other 
current liabilities include tax-liabilities and 
employee-related liabilities which are also not 
borrowed (GDF SUEZ, 2014).  
 
These €34,991m are used to finance current 
assets of €45,256m (loans and non-trade 
receivables: €925m, derivative instruments: 
€7,886m, trade receivables: €21,558m, 
inventories: €4,891m, current financial assets: 
€1,450m, cash: €8,546m; other current assets are 
not included, because they consist of tax 
receivables that may be contested by tax 
authorities (Mills, 1996).  
Obviously, the surplus of current assets in 
the amount of €45,256m-€34,991m=€10,265m is 
financed by long-term debt. Thus, GDF SUEZ 
applies the conservative funding strategy.  
In absence of financing needs surplus funds 
may be invested to generate interest income 
(Gitman and Zutter, 2015). But GDF SUEZ earns 
interest income of only €586m against interest 
expenses of €2,462m and thus struggles to offset 
interest expenses. Furthermore, under the 
conservative funding strategy, interest expenses 
occur constantly, even in absence of urgent 
financing needs like seasonal fluctuations 
(McLaney, 2014). Seasonal fluctuations in the 
energy industry in which GDF SUEZ operates may 
not be predicted in a linear manner (Svehla, 2011). 
But general variations in demand are known and 
may be anticipated in advance (Abdelkader et al., 
2015). Therefore, financing conservatism may be 
misleading for GDF SUEZ. Instead, the company 
should switch to the maturity matching principle. 
In doing so, it could reduce long-term debt and 
save profits which are eroded by interest expenses.  
 
Critical evaluation of the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of the GDF SUEZ’s strategy around 
the working capital    
Working capital is calculated as current 
assets – current liabilities. The idea behind 
working capital management is to maintain enough 
current assets (cash, receivables and inventory) to 
meet the company’s current liabilities (short-term 
finance and trade payables) (ACCA, 2011). Table 1 
shows that GDF SUEZ may run out of liquidity to 
pay for liabilities that become due in the short-
term, increasing bankruptcy risk (Qazi et. al, 2011). 
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Table 1. Working Capital at GDF SUEZ for the years 
2013-2014 
Working capital 
component 
Financial 
Year 2014 
€m 
Financial 
Year 2013 
€m 
Loans and 
receivables 
925 1,470 
Trade and other 
receivables 
21,558 21,057 
Inventories 4,891 4,973 
Cash and cash 
equivalents  
8,546 8,706 
Total current 
assets 
35,920 36,206 
Short-term 
borrowings 
10,297 10,316 
Trade and other 
payables 
18,799 16,398 
Other current 
liabilities* 
14,370 13,521 
Total current 
liabilities 
43,466 40,235 
   
Total working 
capital 
- 7,546 -4,029 
 
*Other current liabilities include tax-liabilities and 
employee-related liabilities which become due 
during the next 12 months according to GDF SUEZ 
(2014). Other current assets (2014: €10,049m / 
2013: €8,157m) are not offset, because they 
consist of tax receivables that may be contested by 
tax authorities (Mills, 1996). 
 
 
The company’s working capital is negative. 
Panigrahi and Chaudhury (2015) claim that 
negative working capital may be tolerable for a 
company to finance growth. But this is not the case 
at GDF SUEZ, which is not growing. Its revenue has 
declined since 2012 by 23% (GDF SUEZ, 2012, 
2014).  
 
Bolek (2013) argues that negative working 
capital may result from a short cash conversion 
cycle (CCC) if the company extends its trade 
payables, but aggressively tries to cash trade 
receivables and to generate cash sales. However, 
contrary to Bolek (2013) the 2013/2014 
receivables of GDF SUEZ amount to €21,057m and 
€21,558m, respectively, being higher than 
payables of €18,799m and €16,398m. Table 2 
shows the cash conversion cycle of GDF SUEZ. 
  
Table 2. Cash Conversion Cycle* of GDF SUEZ for 
the years 2013-2014       
Cash 
Conversion 
Cycle 
component 
Financial 
Year 2014 
days 
(rounded) 
Financial 
Year 2013 
days 
(rounded) 
Change 
in % 
Inventory 
turnover  
Period (ITP) 
(year end 
inventory ./. 
cost of sales 
* 365 days) 
 
 
40 
 
 
36 +11% 
Accounts 
receivable 
collection 
period 
(ARCP) 
(year end 
trade 
receivables 
./. revenue * 
365 days) 
105 87 +21% 
Accounts 
payable 
payment 
period 
(APPP) 
(year end 
trade 
payables ./. 
cost of sales 
* 365 days) 
155 119 +30% 
Cash 
Conversion 
Cycle 
-10 4 -350% 
 
*Cash conversion cycle is calculated according to 
ACCA (2012d).  
 
ITP growth means that fewer sales are 
generated (Garcia et al., 2011). This is consistent 
 Paul Eisenberg / International Business and Accounting Research Journal 3 (1) (2019) 
43 
with the fall in revenue. ARCP has increased by 
21%, showing that GDF SUEZ has become less 
efficient in managing its debtors. The low CCC is 
caused by expanding the APPP. In 2014 GDF SUEZ 
has prolonged the payment period by 30% to 
almost half a year. Relying on trade payables as a 
source of finance may preserve cash flow and 
prevent bank borrowings or overdrafts (Peterson 
and Rajan, 1997). But fast payment is often 
honoured by suppliers with early payment 
discounts. The rate of discounts is usually higher 
than that of bank borrowings (Cuñat and Garcia‐
Appendini, 2012). Thus, the forgone discounts 
constitute a cost of trade credit to GDF SUEZ which 
should be avoided.    
Table 3 shows that even if working capital 
includes other current assets (tax receivables), it is 
still in decline, albeit not negative.  
 
Table 3. Working Capital at GDF SUEZ for the years 
2013-2014 with tax-receivables 
Working capital 
component 
Financial 
Year 2014 
€m 
Financial 
Year 2013 
€m 
Total working 
capital without 
tax receivables 
- 7,546 -4,029 
Other current 
assets  
(tax receivables) 
10,049 8,157 
Total working 
capital with  
tax receivables 
2,503 4,128 
 
 
Altman (1968) argues that declining 
working capital as a percentage of total assets may 
be a warning sign for discontinuance.  At GDF SUEZ 
this ratio falls by 80% from 2.7 in 2013 to 1.5 in 
2014.  
Formula for Working capital as % of Total asset 
     (9) 
Working capital 2013 as per Table 3 
 € 4,128m 
Total assets 2013    
 € 155,932m  
Working capital as % of Total assets 
 € 4,128m * 100 ./. € 155,9 32m = 2.7 
 
Working capital 2014 as per Table 3 
 € 2,503m 
Total assets 2014    
 € 165,305m  
Working capital as % of T otal assets 
 € 2,503m * 100 ./. € 165,305m = 1.5 
 
Working capital calculated as a percentage of 
revenue amounts to 4.7% in 2013 and 3.4% in 
2014, respectively.  
 
Formula for Working capital as % of Revenue 
     (10) 
Working capital 2013 as per Table 3 
 € 4,128m 
Revenue 2013     
 € 87,898 
Working capital as % of Revenue  
 € 4,128m * 100 ./. € 87,898 = 4.7 
  
Working capital 2014 as per Table 3 
 € 2,503m 
Revenue 2014     
 € 74,686 
Working capital as % of Revenue  
 € 2,503m * 100 ./. € 74,686 = 3.4 
 
It is significantly below the average of 15.5% 
of large European businesses (Atrill and McLaney, 
2010). Maintaining low working capital may have 
various advantages. Jensen (1986) argues that high 
working capital may mislead managers to follow a 
low-risk strategy to the detriment of returns and 
shareholders. Also, the disciplining monitoring by 
debt finance providers is weakened if investments 
are backed by high working capital generated 
internally (Pinkowitz, 2000). Thus, low working 
capital may prevent inefficient usage of funds 
(Drobetz et al., 2010). Furthermore, positive 
working capital has to be financed by long-term 
debt (Myddelton, 2000). But long-term finance is 
best suited for long-term projects, not to meet 
current needs (Gillespie, 2001). Also, low working 
capital may impose pressure on management to 
improve operational efficiency because 
management cannot rely on high working capital 
reserves (Wasiuzzaman and Arumugam, 2013). 
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However, at GDF SUEZ operational efficiency 
deteriorates given its falling ITP and ARCP.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
GDF SUEZ maintains low working capital 
deploying trade payables as a source of finance. In 
doing so, it jeopardizes supplier goodwill and 
forgoes significant early payment discounts to the 
detriment of net profits. Its working capital to total 
assets deteriorates, raising going concern issues. 
To master these challenges, GDF SUEZ should 
change its working capital strategy. It should 
accelerate sales and cash receivables more 
aggressively. With cash generated, it should pay 
trade creditors faster to benefit from discounts. 
This could help to reduce costly borrowings and 
improve net profits.     
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